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A Drama in Several  Acts The Fiscal 
Crisis and the UK Welfare State 
John Hills
The final impact on welfare states and social policies of the financial crisis that 
rocked round the world in the Autumn of 2008 will not be clear for many years, 
but in the UK its potentially dramatic effects are already apparent, not least 
through the large and rapid cuts announced for public spending by the new 
Coalition Government in October 2010.
But to understand what might result in terms of the long run reshaping of 
Britain’s welfare state, it should be recognized that the first Act of the drama 
had started a year before.  The former Labour Government had adopted a sys-
tem of setting public spending plans in cash terms for three years at a time.  In 
the Autumn of 2007, it set its plans for the following three years on the assump-
tion that there would continue to be both modest real economic growth, and 
low but positive inflation.  Spending was then set to grow in line with the 
growth of nominal national income – for instance, by about 10 per cent in cash 
terms over the first two years.
In the event, not only did real national income fall for a period as the economy 
moved into recession, but inflation also fell.  Crucially, the government decided 
to stick to its cash spending plans, so spending rose sharply as a share of natio-
nal income.   This fiscal stimulus by setting spending on ‘cruise control’ was 
more important than the explicit ‘stimulus’ measures the Government introdu-
ced later, and as important as the automatic stabiliser effects of rising benefit 
and tax credit payments and falling taxation.  Macroeconomists will argue about 
the scale of the total stimulus, but the crucial feature for understanding the 
long run effect of the crisis on the shape of the welfare state is that this first 
Act involved a step change upwards in real public spending on most services, 
including social spending, rather than just one-off stimulus measures. 
The second Act began with the election of the new Liberal-Conservative Coaliti-
on in May 2010.  The new Government quickly announced that it intended to 
eliminate the budget deficit within four years, rather than halve it over that 
time as its predecessor had planned.  While the roots of what was by now a fiscal 
crisis lay in both rising spending and falling tax revenue through the recession, 
it plans that nearly 80 per cent of deficit reduction should come through spen-
ding cuts and only 20 per cent through tax increases.
However, this second Act is one of ‘targeted retrenchment’.   Some spending 
programmes will be cut by a quarter or more in real terms, but health care, 
pensions, and school education will be to some extent protected (although wit-
hout any room to accommodate pressures such as those from an ageing popu-
lation).  Social security for those of working age will be hit hard.  Against the 
background of a virulent press campaign about ‘welfare scroungers’ and alleged 
cases of benefits for some living in luxury property, social assistance and 
housing allowances are being squeezed hardest.  Over the longer term, some of 
the largest cuts will come through a switch in the indexation of most non-
pension social security benefits to a systematically lower inflation index, so 
their value will fall faster behind the incomes of those in work.  With large cuts 
in other public spending – including dramatically in support for teaching within 
higher education – the overall aim is a reduction in public spending of around 
Euro 100 billion per year by 2014.
Dokumentiert: Am 19. November 
2010 diskutierten im WZB Chiara Sa-
raceno, John Hills, Peter A. Hall und 
Herman Schwartz über das Thema 
„Whose Crisis? The Social Policy Di-
mension of Financial Crisis and What 
it Means for Welfare State Research“. 
Das Panel war Teil der vom Zentrum 
für Sozialpolitk (Universität Bremen) 
und dem WZB organisierten Konfe-
renz „Never Waste a Good Crisis“, ge-
fördert von der VolkswagenStiftung 
im T.H. Marshall Programm. Wir doku-
mentieren hier pointierte Kurzfas-
sungen der Panelbeiträge von Chiara 
Saraceno, Forschungsprofessorin am 
WZB, und John Hills, Direktor des Cen-
tre for Analysis of Social Exclusion an 
der London School of Economics and 
Political Science. Der Beitrag von Pe-
ter A. Hall, Harvard University, („The 
Current Economic Crisis and the Wel-
fare State“) erschien im Dezember 
2010 im ZeS Report. Der Beitrag von 
Herman Schwartz, University of Vir-
ginia, wird in der Frühjahrsausgabe 
des ZeS Report veröffentlicht. 
Aus dem WZB
Überschrift: klein !
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Watching the evolution of policy, the collision of two forces within the Coalition 
is evident.  One side clearly sees this as a crisis ‘not to be wasted’ and an oppor-
tunity to achieve a permanent step down in the role of the state, with a clear 
intention that public spending will end up as a  lower share of national income 
than before the crisis.  But another is attempting to make the cuts ‘fair’ or even 
arguing they can be ‘progressive’.  This is hard, to say the least, given that public 
transfers and services are so much larger in relation to the incomes of those in 
the bottom half than those of the top half of the income distribution.  But across 
many areas the attempts to protect services (if not cash) for those at the bottom 
imply greater focussing of public services through sharper means-tests of one 
kind or another – higher social rents and so greater reliance on means-tested 
housing allowances, for instance, or reduced protection on those just above so-
cial assistance levels from local property taxes.
All of this threatens not just to undermine the new Government’s longer term 
reform plans to improve work incentives and simplify the social security sys-
tem, but also squeezes those with low and middle incomes hard, with of course 
potentially important implications for its base of political support.
But the end result of the two Acts so far will – if the plans are carried through 
– be a significant restructuring of Britain’s welfare state.  By 2013, the plans 
imply that social spending as a whole – social security, health care and educa-
tion – will be much the same shares of national income and of public spending 
as when the crisis hit.  But within that, the balance will shift to health care and 
state pensions.  The previously agreed pension reforms designed to reduce the 
extent of means-testing in old age through improved universal pensions and a 
new low cost funded pension system are being carried through.  By contrast, the 
values of different kinds of transfer and services for the working age populati-
on are being cut back sharply and subject to sharper means-tests.
The net result would be to tow the UK’s system further West across the Atlantic, 
in the direction of something that looks more like the US social spending pat-
tern, dominated as it is by health care and ‘social security’ for the older popula-
tion, and residualised ‘welfare’ for those of working age.
However, such net results depend on current plans actually being carried 
through.  It will be the middle of 2011 before the actual withdrawal of services 
required by the cuts actually hits home to many of the people who use them, 
and the effects of the cuts to social security benefits and tax credits on living 
standards will accumulate over several years.  How Act Three in this drama of 
the welfare state plays out, and how it will differ from the parallel Acts in other 
countries, remains unclear.
Thus far, the recently elected government has fairly widespread acquiescence in 
arguing for the scale and speed of the retrenchment and its balance towards 
public spending bearing the brunt.  This may continue, leaving the net effects to 
unfold as described above.  But when many people are facing actual withdrawal 
of services which they have come to expect, and facing actual reductions in li-
ving standards from reduced transfers, the climate could change very rapidly 
– as it did for instance, when the regressive ‘poll tax’ for financing local govern-
ment was introduced in the late 1980s, precipitating the end of Mrs Thatcher’s 
premiership.
Whether the Coalition government will press ahead with its plans as their ef-
fects hit home on voters – and whether it will hold together if it does so – will 
doubtless be of fascination to observers from other countries.  Those of us living 
in the UK will face all of the results of living through what will undoubtedly be 
‘interesting times’.
